Thursday, January 07, 2016

Analysis of a Dennis Prager essay

When the better and the brighter succumb to the disease of the Age -- particularly when that disease is in many complex ways rendering us vulnerable to an unprecedented (and inveterate) enemy -- one is sorely tempted to pack it up and give up hope for one's civilization. Dennis Prager is one of those better and brighter souls who, alas, has so succumbed.

Were the reader to substitute "Nazi" for the word "Muslim" in his piece, he would see the preposterous tragicomedy unintentionally constructed by Prager. Let us try that little experiment (with a couple of minor tweaks here and there for consistency), shall we...?

 It is not to "prove [her] patriotism" that people ask her [a Nazi who admires Der Fuhrer as the "best model of conduct for all mankind" and who treats Mein Kampf as holy writ and as a guide for a good society] to condemn Nazi mass murder, torture and sexual enslavement. It has nothing to do with patriotism.  

Decent people (including many decent Nazis) make this request for three other reasons: One is to ascertain the moral views of that Nazis. The second is to ascertain how widespread Nazi views are among Nazis. And the third reason is to have as many Nazis as possible condemn Nazi violence in the hope that Nazis considering supporting or engaging in terror will think twice about doing so. It is the most logical request people of goodwill can make when they ask Nazi spokespeople to react to atrocities committed by Nazis in the name of Nazism. How else are non-Nazis to assess Nazism and Nazis? [bold emphasis added]

After this simple exercise, Prager’s entire argument falls apart. The only way to salvage it would be to insist that the proper SAT analogy would be – INTOLERABLE MUSLIM : MUSLIM :: Nazi : German. The situation of analytical incoherence in the Counter-Jihad is sufficiently complex such that it necessitates some explanation of terms before we can fully clarify the usefulness of the SAT analogy.

First of all, we have the problem that in the contextual meaning of the analogy, “Germans” were indeed our enemy in WW2, not merely “Nazis”, and tragically we were forced to kill hundreds of thousands of ordinary German people during the war. So, if the Counter-Jihad Softy (defined, for starters, as a morosoph who glibly lets slip such asinine phrases as “decent Muslims”) would try to salvage Prager’s argument by appealing to a distinction analogous to the “German/Nazi” distinction in its WW2 context, he would run up against the formidable, if not impossible problem the Allies actually faced (and, needless to say, any attempts at 20/20 hindsight would be specious in this regard) when fighting the enemy presenting itself as a fusion of those two categories.

Secondly, the Counter-Jihad Softy who rejects the elementary comparison of “Muslim : Nazi” would be obliged to give us good reasons why we should play Muslim Roulette – trusting innumerable Muslims as “decent” partners (and/or as innocents we are supposed to respect and protect) in our frightfully exigent project to manage the dangerous evils which their Islam is causing the world -- given the mountain of data we already have indicating the formidable, if not impossible problem of taqiyya and the False Moderate. Additionally, this problem, bad enough as it is, is exacerbated by the related, subtler problem of the function of various modalities of Stealth Jihad and their overarching goal & effect of lulling us over a long arc of time into a complacent willingness to accept the modus vivendi fait accompli of innumerable terrorists hidden and swimming among seas of millions of Muslims circulating like cancer cells throughout our Body Politic and its more general socio-cultural organs (not to mention that we reasonably assume that this problem, alarming enough as it is, is metastasizing at an exponential rate we cannot fully calculate in order to manage or prevent).

Thus, for example, we see in Prager’s argument the term useful for all Counter-Jihad Softies – “Islamist”. It’s a term that denotes a non-existent category in the actual Muslim world; a term that has been generated by anxious Westerners trying to grapple with the out-of-control problem of 1.5 billion members of a psychotic cult dedicated to our destruction – whether by hook (visible violence & incitements thereof), or by crook (pretending to be “decent Muslims” and fooling people like Prager) – by artificially articulating a taxonomy of Muslims in order to conceptually exempt vast (but never pinned down, numerically) swaths of Muslims from the judgement of our rational self-defense.

Saturday, December 19, 2015

Not Everybody Loves Raymond

http://img1.rnkr-static.com/user_node_img/94/1879222/870/ray-romano-recording-artists-and-groups-photo-u19.jpg

There are at least five different types of pedagogy at a site, like Jihad Watch, which is involved in trying to educate the public about the dangers of Islam:

1) reporting news about Muslims and about PC MC dhimmis

2) information about Islamic ideology, law, texts and history

3) exposing flawed and/or fraudulent propaganda or argumentation by influential Islam apologists (whether they be Muslims or non-Muslims)

4) rhetorical preaching-to-the-choir inspiration

5) analysis on a theoretical level concerning broader issues, including the nature of Islam, the psychology of Muslims, the nature of PC MC, the psychology of PC MC, and constructive criticism of various anti-Islamic approaches.

It is with regard to #3 where the problem with Raymond Ibrahim comes in most pertinently.
Ibrahim, as most people familiar with Jihad Watch know, is a graduate student in fields related to Middle East studies and is, according to his bio at Jihad Watch, "currently studying toward his doctorate in medieval Islamic history at Catholic University" -- one assumes the one in Washington, D.C. He joined the staff of Jihad Watch over a year ago, if my memory serves me correctly (his bio on Jihad Watch does not provide that information).

The types of pedagogy characterized by #3 as well as #1 depend centrally and crucially on primary source citation and verification. The problem with Ibrahim with regard to #3 (which constitutes most of his contributions thus far to Jihad Watch) is that from what I can gather, most of the time he either does not provide primary source citation, or what he does provide tends to be flawed and therefore virtually worthless as primary source citation.

Without primary source citation, no single claim we make about Islamic ideology, law, texts or history can be verified. And if it remains unverified, the claim is worthless -- or, more precisely, the claim remains in a state of limbo where its effectiveness cannot be utilized, except demagogically, until such time as verification can be provided.

This is not rocket science: if the primary sources that substantiate any given claim Ibrahim makes exist out there, and if Ibrahim has read them for himself, then why does he not provide them with sufficient completeness? What is he waiting for? Some indeterminate time in the future when he will not be so busy with his other projects that he can give his work at Jihad Watch the requisite documentation its readers (including innumerable persons of varying degrees of political and social influence) have a right to expect?

As it stands, Ibrahim's reportorial/scholarly conduct tends to conflate type #3 with type #4 -- i.e., telling the typical pro-Jihad Watch reader what he or she wants to hear about how bad Islam is in varying ways, but not bothering to actually (i.e., sufficiently) substantiate any one of the claims upon which that anti-Islamic message, in its particulars at any given moment, depends. This is fine and dandy for rallying the troops and infusing them with inspiration, but what is any given Jihad Watch reader supposed to do, for example, when they want to use the information Ibrahim is providing them in order to try to persuade a wider circle of strangers, acquaintences, work colleagues, friends, family, their local newspaper editors, their local or national politicians? Is that Jihad Watch reader supposed to repeat the claim they read in one of Ibrahim's pieces on Jihad Watch, and then when asked for verification, after the reference Ibrahim provided in his article turns out to be inadequate, are they just supposed to say -- "Umm. . . well, Raymond told me so. . ." ? The problem with this is that, well, not everyone out there loves Raymond.

These days, it's bad enough to tell people outside of the anti-Islamic portion of the Blogosphere (let alone out in the "real world") that you got some piece of information from Jihad Watch at all. This unfortunate situation is only compounded by the situation we find ourselves in where Ibrahim's poor scholarship on Jihad Watch forces us, more often than not, to provide inadequately referenced claims, at best.

Some cases in point:

Ibrahim's multi-part series on Zakaria Boutros (currently up to Part V), an Egyptian Coptic priest who exposes and mocks the seamy underside of Islam on his television show. Apparently, Boutros televises his episodes in Arabic, and Ibrahim in his reports has relied upon his own translations from Arabic to English. This by itself raises concerns, but since those programs are available online, anyone who knows Arabic and who wants to check on Ibrahim's translation can do the comparison himself. This doesn't do those in the still inchoate anti-Islam movement who are not fluent in Arabic any good, however. The whole point of Ibrahim's series is to bridge this gap from Arabic to English. If Zakaria Boutros is going to be used at all in the War of Ideas, a more rigorous translation system needs to be established, and part of that would require independent verification of Ibrahim's renderings into English by at least two other Arabic speakers. Should there be any disputes, there can be thus established a medium through which such disputes can be discussed on an ongoing basis.

Furthermore, the most glaring problem with Ibrahim's Boutros series is that a veritable cornucopia of claims are reported, and virtually no documentation at all is provided. These are not claims about a book like the Koran where the reader can rather easily cross-check, or even hunt down a verse if the verse number wasn't given in the original report, since the Koran is available on-line in multiple translations into English and after all, it is only one book, with a relatively uniform numbering system (perhaps with minor variations here and there).

Most of the claims of Boutros, however, refer to the Hadiths, and the situation there quickly becomes formidably, if not intolerably, complex. Thus, compounding the problem that we have Ibrahim rendering the Arabic quotations of the Hadiths by Boutros into English -- English renderings, thus, likely to be at variance with the paltry few English translations of the Hadiths into English the reader can scare up -- we have the problem that it becomes enormously difficult for the reader to try to pinpoint the exact source of any particular Hadith quote reported by Ibrahim/Boutros. Needless to say, all that work should be done by both Boutros and Ibrahim, not their audience. The pathetic situation of Western knowledge of Islam can be gleaned from the fact that the best online source of English translations of Hadiths is on the website of the Muslim Students Association based in the University of Southern California. This source has a number of problems:

a) They only provide the three "sahih" (most reliable) collections of Hadiths: Bukhari, Muslim and Dawood. There are also four other sahih collections that should be available to the English readership, aside from numerous others besides these.

b) The reader has no way of telling whether the collections this site provides are in fact complete -- indeed, there are elusive indications that in fact they are not complete, such as apparently large lacunae between volume numbers.

c) But the preceding problem becomes dwarfed now that the site in question has morphed into a new format that apparently does not provide a presentation of the hadith text content for browsing through but only enables access to the text through exact word searches.

d) The more general problem with the Hadith collections of Islam is that they seem to suffer from that amusing problem of bewilderingly complex and irrational annotation systems (if "system" is even the appropriate word and not rather "jungle") characteristic of Oriental compilations of texts in general (afflicting the corpuses of Hinduism and Buddhism as well). This is compounded by the fact that the Hadiths are, in the West, still considered to be mostly only the province of dusty academic scholars who do their assiduously meticulous ant-colony work in their dusty old libraries and publish them in dusty journals difficult to access. Only in the last few years with the still-inchoate anti-Islam movement post-911 realizing it has to know its enemy and realizing that a prodigious source of its enemy's fanatical supremacism and murderousness grows out of the Sunna and that the major core of the Sunna are the Hadiths -- has there become available such sources at all (along with, of course, the chillingly parallel activity of Muslims providing such information on the Internet in their pursuit of Daw'a and Jihad).

Certainly our Western governments cannot be bothered to do its job in the War of Ideas and allocate funding to finance a team of scholars to make the welter of sources revolving around the Sunna available in English to analysts.

The other sources of Boutros quotes and indirect allusions are the Sira and various Tafsirs. The same problems beset these sources as do the Hadiths -- if these more abstruse and recondite writings are not even in a worse condition.

I went to the trouble of going over all five parts of Ibrahim's Boutros series and tallying up the total number of problematic claims -- dividing them into claims for which Ibrahim supplied no reference at all, claims for which he supplied insufficient references, claims with reference citations but referencing books unavailable to readers, :

Part I:

Insufficient References:
5 (example: Another curious hadith contained in Sunan Bayhaqi and which traces to Sunan Abu Dawud (one of the six canonical hadith collections), has Muhammad lifting up his shirt for a man who proceeded to kiss his entire torso, “from his bellybutton to his armpits.”)

No References at all: 2

References to unavailable works: 2

Part I had not one claim (other than references to Koran verses) that provided sufficient referencing.

Part II:


Insufficient References: 4 (example: "a hadith relayed by Abu Hurreira (deemed an extremely reliable narrator), where Muhammad sucked on the tongues of his cousin (and future caliph) Ali’s two boys, Hassan and Hussein. . .")

No references at all: 5 (example: "he moved on to a hadith depicting Muhammad lying next to a dead woman in her grave. . .") [This is a particularly vexing hadith, one I have been trying with frustrating lack of success for years to track down.]

Seemingly complete references to unavailable works: 0.

As with Part I, Part II had not one claim that provided sufficient referencing.

Part III:

Insufficient References: 8

No References at all: "several" ("no less than 32" that purport to support Boutros's claim that Mohammed had transvestite tendencies), in addition to 1

References to unavailable works:

Apparentlly sufficient reference: 3 (example: from Sahih Bukhari (2/911), which records Muhammad saying, “Revelations [i.e., the Koran] never come to me when I’m dressed in women’s clothing—except when I’m dressed in Aisha’s. . .” -- this citation number, of course, will probably lead the reader down a bewildering path of being unable to pinpoint the citation when he tries to find it at the MSA USC site of Bukhari hadiths)

Part IV:

Insufficient References: 2; 1 ("He then read a hadith, narrated by Aisha, and contained in the canonical six. . ."); 8; 1;

No References at all: 32 (Ibrahim reports that Boutros claims that no less than 34 books, including the Tafsir of al-Qurtubi and Sahih Muslim, record that Muhammad used to “fondle”—Botros scowled at the screen—“kiss and have sex while fasting, though he forbade others from doing so.” [thus I put 32 in this category and located the two insufficient references of al-Qurtubi and Sahih Muslimin their appropriate category]; 1; "He went on to quote from a number of hadiths. . ."; "He read from a number of other hadiths, all demonstrative of Muhammad’s sexual proclivities toward menstruating women. . .";

References to unavailable works:

Apparently complete references: 1 (affirming that Muhammad freely had sex with menstruating women, including from Sahih Bukhari (v.5, p. 350). . . [-- another of those references numbers that will probably lead the reader down a dead end in his attempt to verify it]); 2

Part V:

[To be continued, someday...]


Tuesday, December 01, 2015

The Multifarious Strategy of Jihad

Not only is ISIS not the only danger of violent jihad, but violent jihadists are not the only danger in the broader picture.

Which leads me to Daniel Greenfield's oddly mild description of the Hijra: "Syrian migrants, the vast majority of whom are Sunni Muslim economic migrants, not refugees..." This locution underplays the invasion that is going on -- no less military than a conventional military invasion, but of course, seeming to be non-military. For the Counter-Jihad to think this isn't a military invasion -- just because it doesn't look like any military invasions we know from our own world & history -- they would have to consider most Muslims to be non-soldiers in the Umma. That would be a serious error, reflecting a curiously unimaginative (let alone uninformed) thought process. "Oh, those Muslims look like non-combatants who just wanna have a sandwich, so therefore they are not soldiers because they do not fit the parameters of the only definition of a "soldier" I know..."

Because Mohammedans are unable to mount conventional military invasions, given the astronomic asymmetry between Islam and the West on all levels one could measure parity on, they must pull out every other stop and use a combination platter of a strategy short of conventional military invasion. Well, they could try a conventional military invasion; but it's reasonable to suppose that even Muslims aren't stupid enough not to know that they would be put down in a Constantinopolitan Minute if they did.

So merely perform an elementary thought experiment. If you were a member of a Billion-Man Army that

a) wants to conquer a superior enemy, but
b) can't do it in the conventional manner, and
c) you know that
i) merely terror attacks by themselves, or
ii) taqiyya-dawa-immigration by itself

would not likely suffice to chip away at this vastly superior enemy, what would you do?

You would bring in everything but the kitchen sink:

Jihad of the Sword -- an ongoing concatenation of terror attacks -- just enough to wear down the psyche of the enemy, but not so many that they wise up and shut you down

Jihad of Criminality -- under the radar of "terrorism" but still having the subliminal effect, along with the Jihad of the Sword, of making us jittery like a battered wife (and even the PC MCs in Denial deep down feel it too; they just manage to suppress the thought crime of letting it rise into their rational consciousness)

Jihad of the Pen & Mouth (all the various styles & flavors of taqiyya, from public propaganda to interpersonal relations amongst the Infidel populations being infiltrated in various ways)

Jihad of the Feet -- immigration (they must be thanking Allah for how the West has been opening up the gates more and more after 911). This has been going on since the 1960s -- at first it was a slow trickle, then in the 80s and 90s it began to pick up; then after 911, the West didn't do the normal thing and shut off the water, but rather paradoxically & perversely turned the spigot way over to allow a gush of immigration, and kept it going for years as though it were running a nice big, long bubble bath. Then, after the logical devolution of the Arab Spring into the metastasizing train wreck of ISIS, it's like the West took a sledgehammer to the water pipes, or backed up a van to knock over the fire hydrant, or actively pitched in to topple levees to help this Mohammedan Katrina devastate our societies.

Jihad of Lawfare

Jihad of the Publicity Stunt

Jihad of Grievance

And, perhaps the subtlest Jihad of all, the Jihad of Just Being Here -- merely settling in, setting down roots, getting jobs, raising families, having sandwiches, walking around in the streets, shopping, going to school, attending college, joining gyms, etc., all non-verbally telegraphing the overall message: "We're here, we are insinuating our threads into your cultural fabric, get used to it."

(Of course, these are all intertwined and I may be making some fine distinctions. Also, there may be more flavors of Jihad that have escaped my mind at the moment...)

Perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind is a dynamic which I notice typically seems to elude many Counter-Jihadists. Apparently, they haven't thought things through. Because the Jihads I listed above that follow the first two -- Jihad of the Sword & Jihad of Criminality -- are all ostensibly non-violent, some in the Counter-Jihad conclude that Muslims are taking over "without a shot being fired" or "taking over without guns and bombs". In fact, what we've seen from the 911 attacks forward right up to today, is that, to put it bluntly, the more that Muslims explode, the more -- not the less -- we bend over to try to respect and accommodate them. This may seem strangely counter-intuitive -- but that's precisely how incoherently irrational Western PC MC is. While it's irrational, it does have its own logic, which I have analyzed at length in dozens of essays on my blog over the years. (For a partial list, see: http://tiny.cc/zn9u6x -- and for the best introduction to this subtopic, see: http://tiny.cc/rp9u6x )

And by now, as intellectually compromised as Muslims may be, they must have noticed this dynamic; they must have noticed that punctuating the West with terror attacks now and then -- and keeping the threat as cracklingly alive as a live wire poised above a bathtub with a baby splashing around in it -- actually facilitates their ongoing stealth jihad.

Saturday, November 28, 2015

The Supremacist Expansionism of Islam and Muhammad's "Three Sparks"

Muslims mean it when they declare their intent to conquer, subjugate, and destroy. They mean it with a degree of fanaticism which the modern West has long forgotten, and which the modern West thinks no longer exists (except, perhaps, among Christian “cults”).

Muslims also are profoundly inspired and motivated by exemplars from history: viz., the conquest of Persia and Byzantium mentioned by this cleric.

And those exemplars, in turn, derive their profound significance and thrilling inspiration to the Muslim due to their representation as realizations and fulfillment of the assurances in the Koran and the prophecies of Mohammed.

In this case, we are speaking of the prophecy of Mohammed recorded in, among other places, Ibn Ishaq, when during the “Battle of the Trench”, Mohammed helped his men dig a trench, and while his shovel (or the 7th-century Bedouin equivalent of a shovel) struck rock in the trench, he saw three sparks in succession:

The first spark was supposedly the revelation to Mohammed of the promise of the Islamic conquest of Arabia.

The second spark was the revelation of the promise of the Islamic conquest of the East (for which Muslims for centuries — until Western Colonialism ruined it — could point proudly to Persia, India, central Asia and Indonesia: which is why the Persian Revolution of 1979, taking back Persia for the Dar-al-Islam from Western-supported “traitors” the Pahlavis, is so important, btw).

The third spark was the revelation of the promise of the Islamic conquest of “Rome”.

Now, we need to think medievally here — for that is the way Muslims think. What is symbolized as “Rome” in that promise is only partially supplied by Byzantium — for at the time the Muslims began trying to conquer Earth beginning in the 7th century and relentlessly proceeding from then over the ensuing centuries (only inhibited in their eschatological project by various impediments of the real world), the classical Roman Empire had more or less disappeared, with the locus of power and civilization slowly shifting northward (though it would take another century or two, by the 9th century, for the Franks to develop the self-conception of a new “Roman Empire” under Charlemagne) — and shifting eastward.

The eastward shift of “Rome” had begun already in the 4th century a.d., when the Roman Emperor Constantine (who during his reign momentously converted to Christianity, thus beginning a Christian Rome) moved the capital of the Empire to a new city far to the east, christened Constantinople. This in many ways in the centuries after the 4th became the “new Rome” — a center of civilization, culture, the arts, technology, philosophy for a while surpassing the still groggy Western Europeans. And this Jewel of the East, Constantinople, became the center of Byzantium, the so-called “second Roman Empire” in the scheme of the translatio imperii. The “third Rome” in that scheme later moved further eastward, to Moscow.

In the Muslim mind, the modern West, with America at its vanguard, is clearly “Rome” — and in our own scheme of the translatio imperii, it is in a sense the “fourth Rome”.

To get back to the white-hot present that focuses a lens on the distant past so exigent for the modern Muslim: This Egyptian cleric is harking back to the Islamic conquest of Byzantium — a real conquest in which Muslims fought, killed, and won spectacularly, when in 1453 they succeeded in taking the heart and soul of “Rome”: Constantinople — or at least what had been the heart and soul; for superiority of civilization had already begun shifting Westward in the meantime, and what Muslims gained dramatically in the East, they would shortly lose dramatically in the West, when Christians took back Spain finally in 1492.

But this success in 1453 wasn’t merely the fruit of one military assault, or even of a few attempts during a few years beforehand. It was, as the Orientalist Louis Massignon (mentor of the Orientalist Bernard Lewis) wrote, the fruit of centuries of literally prayerful planning — along with a stillicide of small-scale assaults and razzias lasting centuries.

As Massignon wrote in his essay, Textes relatifs à la prise de Constantinople en 1453, “Texts pertaining to the capture of Constantinople in 1453”), published in 1953 in the journal Oriens (Vol. 6, No. 1):

…in the case of the capture of Constantinople by Islam, we are in the presence of authentic texts which, going back more than six centuries prior, have clearly foretold that event, conceived as a sort of Sign of confirmation of the finality of Holy War for the Muslim World.

Massignon’s long essay makes clear that Muslims weren’t merely sitting around convinced of a “foretelling” — they actively prayed for centuries, and delivered and listened to sermons for centuries that referred constantly — weekly, monthly, yearly, and for centuries — to the promise of the conquest of this “Rome”.

And during that time of “pious” prayer that attuned their collective psyche toward the goal of militaristic conquest, Muslims also poked away at the superior tegument of the Byzantine Empire, in hundreds of attacks along its border, over the centuries incrementally winning one piece of land after the other, slowly but surely encroaching upon its land, and slowly but surely, through savage terror attacks at the slowly shrinking borders, weakening the resolve of at least some of the Christians.
It would be instructive at this juncture to examine how the analogical comparison of the Islamic conquest of the “second Rome” fails to correspond exactly to the current Islamic desideratum to conquer the “new Rome” — the modern West:

1) First and foremost, the relative parity of the Empire and its Attackers differs in the two cases: the modern West is astronomically more superior in every way to Muslims today, than Byzantium was during those centuries to the Muslims of their day.

This is true notwithstanding the obvious fact that Byzantium was sufficiently superior to Muslims to be able to withstand conquest for the approximately 600 years during which Muslims were trying to chip away at it in order to conquer it. Were Muslims at any point, from the 8th century clear up through the 15th century, able to launch a major military invasion of Byzantium in order to conquer it, they would have done so. They evidently realized, both intellectually and pragmatically, that a frontal assault was impossible — at least during the initial centuries: the frontal assault finally became possible by the middle of the 15th century: and it was spectacularly successful, and Constantinople, the jewel of Christian Rome, became Istanbul, the jewel of the Islamic Caliphate for all of the world’s Muslims — right up until it was dismantled in 1923 by the Westernized Turk, Ataturk (and also due to Western pressure in the wake of the restructuring of the Third World by the West after World War One).

2) Because of #1, Muslims realize they cannot chip away at the superior tegument of this relatively new Enemy in the same way they chipped away at Byzantium.

In the case of Byzantium, they chipped away through a long series of razzias (the Islamic equivalent of Blitzkrieg commando raids — think Mumbai, for a grimly modern comparison). These razzias did not necessarily intend to actually succeed in taking land: one function they had was simply to terrorize the populace of the region, and over time, and successive razzias, to wear down their morale, in preparation for assaults of more military earnest. Both types were deployed in the protracted centuries-long invasion of Byzantium. With its new Enemy, the modern West, Muslims so far can only do a modern variation on the razzia — the “terrorist attack”. This type must be further modified from the medieval version of commando raids — for which modern explosives, unavailable in those former centuries — are all too perfectly suitable. When it comes to markedly less superior cultures — such as India, Africa, SE Asia, central Asia — Muslims currently in our time are able to deploy commando raids and even outright military assaults in addition to terrorist attacks. But against the modern West, Muslims so far have only been able to deploy terrorist attacks.

3) In addition to poking away at the superior modern West with terrorist attacks here and there, Muslims are also deploying another style of invasion they probably never deployed before against any other enemy of the past (at least not on this scale of magnitude): massive ostensibly peaceful immigration of Muslims into the West.

One major reason why Muslims probably never deployed this particular style before in history is probably because they didn’t have to, since commando raids in preparation for military assaults were doable then — as they are now with regard to relatively backward regions of the Third World, as mentioned above: for the societies the Muslims were trying to conquer were not so astronomically superior to Muslims as the modern West is now.

Another major reason why Muslims probably never deployed mass immigration into superior civilizations they intended to conquer in the past was because pre-modern civilizations weren’t as stupid as the modern West in allowing millions of Muslims to settle into their societies.
Muslims for at least the last quarter-century if not half-century have realized that massive immigration of Muslims into the West is one way to weaken the West (cf. the infamous Boumedienne speech at the U.N. in 1974). That immigration has only been increasing with each passing decade, and ironically, even post-911, and even during the Bush years, it continued to increase.
The massive influx of Muslims into the West helps the Islamic project of the conquest of this “new Rome” in several ways:

a) through the obtrusive stillicide of Muslims arrogantly asserting themselves — and their alien, hostile and anti-liberal ideology — into our societies in myriad ways which collectively and cumulatively can have the effect of wearing down our psyches and resolve to resist Islam — this effect augmented by our own society still laboring under the delusion that Muslims are just one more “culture” we must accept and integrate in order to demonstrate our “tolerance” for “the Other”

b) closely related to (a), through the increasing insinuation of demands for ever more pieces of the puzzle of Sharia Law to be integrated into the sociopolitical textures of the West — a process that, of course, could never be fully realized since Sharia Law is diametrically and profoundly antagonistic to most Western laws and liberal mores: the process is less a project of attempting successfully to supplant Western laws with Shariah than it is an attempt to assault the psyches of Westerners as part of the broader project of weakening their resolve (a project for which violent terrorism is a necessary adjunct) in preparation for the day when the West will be, at least in the minds of Muslims, sufficiently weakened to enable Muslims to prepare outright commando raids and military assaults.

c) One element in (b) clues the reader into this third function of Islamic immigration: namely, the need for violent terrorist attacks as part of the overall project of weakening the West over time: terrorist attacks on such a superior civilization as the modern West require patient planning and deep infiltration. The latter is facilitated by the massive immigration of Muslims, and further enabled by our own Western PC MC tendency to trust Muslims and invite them more deeply into our societies. While the tactic of innumerable seemingly random terror attacks (even by Muslim “lone wolves” who seem unconnected to Islam at large) have the effect of demoralizing the collective psyche of Westerners, we should bet that Muslims are also planning grander attacks in the future — attacks that would make 911 pale in comparison. Deeper and deeper infiltration will, thus, enable Muslims to plot and successfully deploy those grander terrorist attacks within the West — likely using one flavor or another of WMDs (chemical, biological, radioactive).

This third function also helps highlight a difference, among some similiarities, between the Islamic strategy to conquer Byzantium, and its current strategy to conquer us: the Muslims during the centuries they were chipping away at the superior civilization of Byzantium were unable to deploy terror attacks within the heart of Byzantium, in any of the major cities, and certainly not Constantinople. The reason they were unable was because Muslims had not been allowed to immigrate in mass numbers. We, the modern West, by contrast, have allowed Muslims to immigrate in mass numbers — and that is precisely why Muslims have been able to attack the Constantinople of the 21st Century: New York City (along with other major cities of this “new Rome” — London and Madrid; and we know they have been trying to attack Paris, Berlin and Rome for years).

For more on the invasion and conquest of Byzantium by Muslims, see The Conquest of Constantinople: A Jihad Planned in Prayer for Centuries

Friday, November 27, 2015

The Casey Doctrine

General George  W. Casey, Jr. -- Silver-haired Anglo-Saxon 4-Star General and Chief of Staff of the United States Army (2007-2011).

In an interview on Meet the Press on November 8, 2009 (three days after the Ford Hood massacre), Casey iterated his PC MC spasm:

"Our diversity not only in our Army, but in our country, is a strength. And as horrific as this tragedy was, if our diversity becomes a casualty, I think that's worse."

Also reported by Reuters.

Friday, November 20, 2015

A partial list of my essays on StealthJihad/Violent Jihad

Wednesday, October 14, 2015

A partial list of my Hesperado essays on the Problem of the Problem

-- the Problem of the Problem being the problem of persisting Western myopia to the problem of Islam.

As my title indicates, this is only a partial list.  I began combing through my archives with the intention of amassing all my essays that analyze this problem (of the problem); but as soon as I began doing it, I realized I have way too many to catalogue in one fell swoop.  Not to mention that there may be more among my overall 1,000+ essays on Hesperado that deal with this issue, but which I'd only know by delving deeper into the text of the essay in question -- which I don't have time to do at present.

Thus, for now, a partial list:

Leftists Are Not Relativists

"Spooks": Counter-every-kind-terrorism-except-Islamic

Excellently crappy television: Oz, The Unit, and 24

PC MC in 1917

Proto-PC MC: Those conservative 1950s!

Quantum Ignorance

Four phases of Western universalism, and the humanity of Muslims

Wildersianism and the "inner Westerner" inside Muslims

When did PC MC begin? More info on that question...

Voegelinians and Islam

He Said, Ed Said

Healthy Multiculturalism, and Unhealthy Multiculturalism

Self-Criticism and the Mother of all Others

PC MC: Neither Left nor Right, but Ambidextrous

The Pretzel Logic of PC MC

Morosophy and the Mother of all Others

Lawrence Auster's First Law of Majority-Minority Relations, and Muslims

Western Amnesia and Islamnesia

Anti-Racism: The primary reason why the West persists in whitewashing the problem of Islam

PC Multiculturalism and non-Western culture

Montaigne: Godfather of PC MC?

The Psychology of PC MC

The Logic of the PC MC Paradigm

The PC MC Paradigm

The Anti-Western Westerner

The Sorta Kinda Anti-Westerner: "Gnosticism Lite"

The Race Factor:  Reality, and political reality

When Did PC MC Begin? Fourth Case Study

Reverse Racism and Islam

No Smoking / No Islam

 One Big Piece of the PC MC Jigsaw Puzzle

When Did PC MC Begin? Third Case Study

When Did PC MC Begin? Second Case Study

When Did Politically Correct Multiculturalism Begin?

The 10 Commandments of PC Multi-Culturalism

"Islamonausea" and PC Multiculturalism

Crypto-Racism and PC Multiculturalism

The PC Filter Decaffeinates Islam

The Problem of the West